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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
Plaintiff and AppeUa.nt, 
EUCEXE EDWARD GRUBE~ ) 
vs. \ 
JOHN W. TURNER, \ 
Defendant and Re8110ndent. } 
Case No. 
9056 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELI1fiNARY STATEMENT 
Reference herein to appellanf's brief will be designated 
by the Jetter ~'En. 
STATE~iENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts as subs tan ti a 1 ly correct a p pella.nt' s 
statement of facts. 
STATEiviEK~r OF POINTS 
POINT L 
THE COIVI1iiT1-TRNT OF APPELLANT ISSUED 
UPON EXPIRATION OF filS ST ... ~Y OF EXE~ 
CUTION OF SRNTE:-JC~~ IN ALL RESPEC1"'LS 
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CONFORMED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW INASMUCH ASAP-
PELLANT Vv AS NEVER PLACED ON INDEF-
INITE PROBATION AND WAS HENCE NOT 
ENTITLED TO A HEARING PRIOR TO SAID 
COMMITJfiENT. 
POINT IL. 
EVEN HAD APPELLANT ACHIEVED THE 
STATUS OF PROBATION SUCH STATuS WAS 
FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD AND AT THE EX-
PIRATION THEREOF THE LOWER COURT 
WAS FULLY E~1POWERED TO COMMIT 
SUCH PROBATIONER WITHOUT FURTHER 
FORMA"L PROCEEDINGS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I~ 
THE COMMITl\iENT OF APPELLANT ISSUED 
UPON EXPIRATION OF~ HIS STAY OF EXE~ 
CUTION OF SENTENCE IN ALL RESPECTS 
CONFORl'IED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
DUE PROCESS OF LA\f INASMUCH ASAP-
PELLANT \VAS NEVER PLACED ON INDEF-
INITE PROBATI()l\~ AND WAS HENCE NOT 
ENTITLED TO A HEARING PRIOR TO SAID 
COMMITMENT~ 
Appellant p1aces great stress upon his allegation that 
he \Vas denied due prodess of law in the commitment pro-
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ceedings, which he a lieges effected a ~'termina tion't of his 
probationary status (B. 7 and· 8) . Specifically, he states 
due process 'V'aS denied in that he was not permitted to 
appear~ to answer the charges against him,. to confront the 
witnesses against him~ to cross-examine such witnesses~ 
nor to have counsel represent hhn (B. 8 and 9) . 
It is respondent\) position that appellant was in no 
way denied due process by his commitment to the Utah 
State Prison 'vithout a prior hearing ina.smu ch as he was 
never on probationt and therefore \vag, not entitled to such 
hearing. 
While it is true that this Court ha.s held a person placed 
on probation for an indefinite period such as '~for good 
behavior'' has a right to a hearing as to revocation of such 
indefinite probation prior to a commitment being is~ ued. 
State v. ZolantakisJ 70 Utah 2961 259 Pac. 1044; it is also 
true that a stay to a date certain of the execution of an 
imposed sentence with no probationary status created does 
not bestow such right to a hea1,ing, and upon expiration of 
said stay, a commitment may issue without the formality 
of a hearing. Demmick v. Harris~ 107 Utah 471~ 155 P. 2d 
,Llf.tt~Such commitment not only "mayu issueJ but as Chief 
Justice Larsen in his concurring opinion in the Demrniek 
case stated : 
HSuch stay of execution operated only to delay 
commitment until the day certain fixed in the stay. 
At the expiration of that time, commitment issues 
as of course un1ess the court by order grants a fur-
ther stay .. ~' 
Respondent contends that appellant after being sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison, had the execution of that 
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sentence suspended to a date certain in the future~ an act 
well 'vithin the discretionary right o£ the court. WiUiamts 
v. Harrig~ 106 Utah 387, 149 P. 2d 640; 77-35-17~ U. C. A. 
1953~ The pertinent portions of the above statute read as 
follOWM ~ 
~'Upon a plea of guilty or convieti on of any 
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the 
public interest, the court ha-ving jurisdiction may 
suspend the imposition or the execution of sentenee 
and may place the defendant on probation for sueh 
period of time as the court .sha1I determine/' (Em-
phasis added.) 
It should be noted the above statute gives the court 
the authority to suspend the execution of a sentencet and 
in addition gives it authority to also place a defendant upon 
probation~ two separate and distinct powers~ neither depen-
dent upon the other. 
Although the record does not indicate the lo,ver court's 
purpose in granting such stay in this iiiBtance, this pro-
cedure is often uti1ized to grant the committing court time 
to investigate the arlvisabiJity of placing the defendant on 
probation, a decision which often takes some little time. 
The fact remains, however., that \V hatever the court's pur-
pose, the appellant \Vas granted such :stay and that subse-
quent1y this stay vFn~ extended from date certain to date 
certain until at the expiration of the last such stay~ it v.Tas 
not extended further and the commitment issued. 
At the time the original stay \vas gr anted:r there was 
no mention made of probation by the ]o,ver court. The 
a.ppellant was placed under the supervision of the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department during his stay; however, 
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placing a man under the supervision of this department has 
been specifically held not to constitute the creation of pro-
bationary status. Demmiek v. Harris, supra. Indeed) the 
Demmick case in which the party claiming the right to a 
hearing was held not to be a probationer, and hence nut 
entitled to such hearing~ had far more of the indicia of Pro-
bation present therein than does the instant case. In that 
case the court told the defendant his stay was dependent 
upon his conduct. l-Ie was further told· the probation offi-
cer would attempt to find employment for him and the 
commitment stated: ~'Upon recommendation of the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department~ and good cause appear-
ing'" * * * Demmick · v. H a·rri .. J:j~ supra.. 1_1-Ie above 
items are clearly more suscepti b1e to the interpretation of a 
probationary status than are the facts in the instant case, 
wherein ap pe llan t \Vas not told his continued stay was de~ 
pendent upon his behaviour, and \Vas thus given no indica-
tion that he could expect furtheJ. ... sta.ys, there \Vas no indi-
cation employment \vould be found for him:t again indicat-
ing no intent of continued .stay or of a probation~ and the 
commitment in the instant ease contained no reference to 
recommendations of the Probation Department:t and 1vas not 
based upon cause, but simply noted the stay had on that 
date expired and there was no c.a use appearing for furthro .. 
stay~ 
Since this Court has held that despite the lunguage of 
the lo\ver court, noted the rein the -:; tatus of the .a pp ell ant 
in the Dernmick case \vus not that of a probationer, Dem-
mick v. Harris) gupra; Baine v. BecksteadJ _ . _ U. 2d _ . _ ~
... P+ 2d _ .. ; it appears evident that appellant in the in-
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sta.nt case has even less ciaim to a probationary status than 
did Demmiek, even though appellant's stay was extended for 
a somewhat longer period than was Demmick's. 
Therefore~ since appellant \Vas not placed on probation, 
but was only granted a temporary stay of execution of his 
imposed sentence, he was in no \vay entitled to a hearing 
when at the expiration of the last extension of this stay no 
further stay was gra.nted and a commitment was issued. 
POINT II .. 
EVEN HAD APPELLANT ACHIEVED THE 
STATL"S OF PROBATION Sl}CH STATUS WAS 
FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD AND AT THE EX-
PIRATION THEREOF THE LOWER COURT 
WAS FULLY EMPOWERED TO COMldiT 
SUCH PROBATIONER WITHOUT FURTHER 
FORMAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Should it be determined that the action of the lower 
court in this- case did amount to p1acing appellant in a pro-
bationary status during his stay of execution~ it must still 
be remembered that said stay of execution and hence said 
probation also \vas granted to a date certain. It was only to 
such date that appel1an t had any rights to expect his stay 
and hence his probation to continue.. It cannot be argued 
that at such expiration date a court is not as fully empow .. 
erect to commit a defendant as it was at the time of the 
original sentencing_, the only question here is whether a 
hearing must be held prior to such commitment. 
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The cases cited by appellant to support his claim that 
a hearing i~ the right of a probationer prior to the termina-
tion or revocation of his probation and commitment are 
cases either of indefinite probation, State v. Zolantakis~ 
supra, a s.ituati on here not present; or appellant's cases are 
factually distinguishable, }rfcCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 
160 P. 2d 721, wherein the appellant "\Vas a parollee and 
not a probationer; or they involve attempts to commit a 
probationer during the definite term of h if-; probation as 
the terms revocation, or termination imply~ and not at the 
expiration thereof. State v. B onza, 106 Utah 5 53, 150 P. 
2d 970; Ch1~tiarr..sen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P .. 2d 314, 
and Williams v. H a-rrisJ supra. Therein lies the crucial diBI-
ti nguish ing factor \Vhich renders these cases insuffi eie nt to 
support appellant~s position .. 
The question of ,.vhether a probationer on probation 
for a definite period of time rnay have th.at probation re-
voked 'vithont first being heard is not here involved. In the 
instant case there \vas not a re·vocation- of an existing pro~ 
bation, appellant'~ stay and his probation had rather ex-
pired and hence ceased to exist~ At the time appellant Vi7aS 
sentencedf had execution of his sentence stayed anrl "vas 
placed on probation~ it was c1early stated that such stay 
and probation \Vere to conti11ue only to u definite time in 
the future. ...4-.ppellant, therefore, could expect to remain 
free for that time only~ regardless of how exemplary his 
conduct might be. He could further expect to be committed 
at the expiration of that period ·unl-ess the court chose at 
that time to grant further stay. He harl no more right to 
further stay~ than he had to his initial one~ the matter ,.vas 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
completely within the discretion uf the Court in each in-
stance~ Therefore, in the instant case even had the appel-
lant been on probation prior to his commitment as of the 
expiration date of his stay and p.ro bation~ he was no longer 
in such status. He was at that time no more nor less than 
a man la'"rfully sentenced to the State Prison and the court 
cou 1 d~ as noted above, either grant further stay of execution 
of said sentence, or commit him under that sentence, such 
choice wholly within the discretion of the court. The court 
needn~t have had cause to commit appellant at that time 
and it was enough that the court had no cause not to~ that 
it sa'\.v no reason to further stay the execution. 
In short~ even assuming appellant to have been on pr().-
bation during the term of his stay1 that probation term~ 
inated when the stay terminated and he was at such time 
.subject to commitment with no further hearing as he "vas 
no longer in a probationary .status. 
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CONCL'CSION 
Appellant was not entitled to a hearing because he was 
not on probation but only free on a temporary stay of exe-
c uti on of his sentence to a date certain, and at expiration 
thereof had no ~;Tight"' to further stay but was subject to 
immediate cotnmitment. 
Further, even had appellant been on probation, any 
such probation was only effective during the period of the 
stay, and being coterminous 'vith said stay and of equally 
definite duration, ended with the last stay date, thus sub-
jecting a ppclla nt to immediate commital~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
"V ALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General~ 
RICHARD RL BOYLE~ 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Atttnweys for Respond&nt. 
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